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We propose a systematic methodology for defining tournament solutions
as extensions of maximality. The central concepts of this methodology are
maximal qualified subsets and minimal stable sets. We thus obtain an infinite
hierarchy of tournament solutions, encompassing the top cycle, the uncovered
set, the Banks set, the minimal covering set, the tournament equilibrium set,
the Copeland set, and the bipartisan set. Moreover, the hierarchy includes
a new tournament solution, the minimal extending set, which is conjectured
to refine both the minimal covering set and the Banks set.
1 Introduction
Given a finite set of alternatives and choices between all pairs of alternatives, how
to choose from the entire set in a way that is faithful to the pairwise comparisons?
This simple, yet captivating, problem is studied in the literature on tournament so-
lutions. A tournament solution thus seeks to identify the “best” elements according
to some binary dominance relation, which is usually assumed to be asymmetric and
complete. Since the ordinary notion of maximality may return no elements due to
cyclical dominations, numerous alternative solution concepts have been devised and
axiomatized (see, e.g., Moulin, 1986; Laslier, 1997). Tournament solutions have nu-
merous applications throughout economics, most prominently in social choice theory
where the dominance relation is typically defined via majority rule (e.g., Fishburn, 1977;
Bordes, 1983). Other application areas include multi-criteria decision analysis (e.g.,
Arrow and Raynaud, 1986; Bouyssou et al., 2006), non-cooperative game theory (e.g.,
Fisher and Ryan, 1995; Laffond et al., 1993b; Duggan and Le Breton, 1996), and coop-
erative game theory (Gillies, 1959; Brandt and Harrenstein, 2010).
In this paper, we approach the tournament choice problem using a methodology con-
sisting of two layers: qualified subsets and stable sets. Our framework captures most
known tournament solutions (notable omissions are the Slater set and the Markov set)
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and allows us to provide unified proofs of properties and inclusion relationships between
tournament solutions.
In Section 2, we introduce the terminology and notation required to handle tourna-
ments and define six standard properties of tournament solutions: monotonicity (MON),
independence of unchosen alternatives (IUA), the weak superset property (WSP), the
strong superset property (SSP), composition-consistency (COM), and irregularity (IRR).
The remainder of the paper is then divided into four sections.
Qualified Subsets (Section 3) The point of departure for our methodology is to collect
the maximal elements of so-called qualified subsets, i.e., distinguished subsets that admit
a maximal element. In general, families of qualified subsets are characterized by three
properties (closure, independence, and fusion). Examples of families of qualified subsets
are all subsets with at most two elements, all subsets that admit a maximal element,
or all transitive subsets. Each family yields a corresponding tournament solution and
we thus obtain an infinite hierarchy of tournament solutions. The tournament solutions
corresponding to the three examples given above are the set of all alternatives except the
minimum, the uncovered set (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980), and the Banks set (Banks,
1985). Our methodology allows us to easily establish a number of inclusion relationships
between tournament solutions defined via qualified subsets (Proposition 2) and to prove
that all such tournament solutions satisfy WSP and MON (Proposition 1). Based on an
axiomatic characterization using minimality and a new property called strong retentive-
ness, we show that the Banks set is the finest tournament solution definable via qualified
subsets (Theorem 1).
Stable Sets (Section 4) Generalizing an idea by Dutta (1988), we then propose a
method for refining any suitable solution concept S by defining minimal sets that satisfy
a natural stability criterion with respect to S. A crucial property in this context is
whether S always admits a unique minimal stable set. For tournament solutions defined
via qualified subsets, we show that this is the case if and only if no tournament contains
two disjoint stable sets (Lemma 2). As a consequence of this characterization and a
theorem by Dutta (1988), we show that an infinite number of tournament solutions
(defined via qualified subsets) always admit a unique minimal stable set (Theorem 3).
Moreover, we show that all tournament solutions defined as unique minimal stable sets
satisfy WSP and IUA (Proposition 4), SSP and various other desirable properties if the
original tournament solution is defined via qualified subsets (Theorem 4), and MON
and COM if the original tournament solution satisfies these properties (Proposition 5
and Proposition 6). The minimal stable sets with respect to the three tournament
solutions mentioned in the paragraph above are the minimal dominant set, better known
as the top cycle (Good, 1971; Smith, 1973), the minimal covering set (Dutta, 1988), and
a new tournament solution that we call the minimal extending set (ME). Whether
ME satisfies uniqueness turns out to be a highly non-trivial combinatorial problem and
remains open. If true, ME would be contained in both the minimal covering set and the
Banks set while satisfying a number of desirable properties. We conclude the section
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by axiomatically characterizing all tournament solutions definable via unique minimal
stable sets (Proposition 7).
Retentiveness and Stability (Section 5) ME bears some resemblance to Schwartz’s
tournament equilibrium set TEQ (Schwartz, 1990), which is defined as the minimal
retentive set of a tournament. There are some similarities between retentiveness and
stability and, as in the case of ME , the uniqueness of a minimal retentive set and thus
the characteristics of TEQ remain an open problem (Laffond et al., 1993a; Houy, 2009).
We show that Schwartz’s conjecture is stronger than ours (Theorem 6) and has a number
of interesting consequences such as that TEQ can also be represented as a minimal stable
set (Theorem 7) and is strictly contained in ME (Corollary 2).
Quantitative Concepts (Section 6) We also briefly discuss a quantitative version of our
framework, which considers qualified subsets that are maximal in terms of cardinality
rather than set inclusion. We thus obtain the Copeland set (Copeland, 1951) and—using
a slightly modified definition of stability—the bipartisan set (Laffond et al., 1993b). This
completes our picture of tournament solutions and their corresponding minimal stable
sets as given in Table 1 on page 25.
2 Preliminaries
The core of the problem studied in the literature on tournament solutions is how to
extend choices in sets consisting of only two elements to larger sets. Thus, our primary
objects of study will be functions that select one alternative from any pair of alterna-
tives. Any such function can be conveniently represented by a tournament, i.e., a binary
relation on the entire set of alternatives. Tournament solutions then advocate different
views on how to choose from arbitrary subsets of alternatives based on these pairwise
comparisons (see, e.g., Laslier, 1997, for an excellent overview of tournament solutions).
2.1 Tournaments
Let X be a universe of alternatives. The set of all finite subsets of set X will be denoted
by F0(X) whereas the set of all non-empty finite subsets of X will be denoted by F(X).
A (finite) tournament T is a pair (A,≻), where A ∈ F(X) and ≻ is an asymmetric
and complete (and thus irreflexive) binary relation on X, usually referred to as the
dominance relation.1 Intuitively, a ≻ b signifies that alternative a is preferable to b. The
dominance relation can be extended to sets of alternatives by writing A ≻ B when a ≻ b
for all a ∈ A and b ∈ B. When A or B are singletons, we omit curly braces to improve
readability. We further write T(X) for the set of all tournaments on X.
1This definition slightly diverges from the common graph-theoretic definition where ≻ is defined on
A rather than X. However, it facilitates the sound definition of tournament functions (such as
tournament solutions or concepts of qualified subsets).
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For a set B, a relation R, and an element a, we denote by DB,R(a) the dominion of
a in B, i.e.,
DB,R(a) = { b ∈ B | a R b},
and by DB,R(a) the dominators of a in B, i.e.,
DB,R(a) = { b ∈ B | b R a}.
Whenever the tournament (A,≻) is known from the context and R is the dominance
relation ≻ or B is the set of all alternatives A, the respective subscript will be omitted
to improve readability.
The order of a tournament T = (A,≻) refers to the cardinality of A. A tournament
T = (A,≻) is called regular if |D(a)| = |D(b)| for all a, b ∈ A.
Let T = (A,≻) and T ′ = (A′,≻′) be two tournaments. A tournament isomorphism of
T and T ′ is a bijective mapping pi : A→ A′ such that a ≻ b if and only if pi(a) ≻′ pi(b).
A tournament T = (A,≻) is called homogeneous (or vertex-transitive) if for every pair
of alternatives a, b ∈ A there is a tournament isomorphism pi : A → A of T such that
pi(a) = b.
2.2 Components and Decompositions
An important structural concept in the context of tournaments is that of a component. A
component is a subset of alternatives that bear the same relationship to all alternatives
not in the set.
Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament. A non-empty subset B of A is a component of T
if for all a ∈ A \ B either B ≻ a or a ≻ B. A decomposition of T is a set of pairwise
disjoint components {B1, . . . , Bk} of T such that A =
⋃k
i=1Bi. Given a particular
decomposition B˜ = {B1, . . . , Bk} of T , the summary of T is defined as the tournament
on the individual components rather than the alternatives. Formally, the summary
T˜ = (B˜, ≻˜) of T is the tournament such that for all i, j ∈ {1, . . . , k} with i 6= j,
Bi ≻˜ Bj if and only if Bi ≻ Bj.
Conversely, a new tournament can be constructed by replacing each alternative with a
component. For notational convenience, we tacitly assume that N ⊆ X. For pairwise
disjoint sets B1, . . . , Bk ⊆ X and tournaments T˜ = ({1, . . . , k}, ≻˜), T1 = (B1,≻1), . . . ,
Tk = (Bk,≻k), the product of T1, . . . , Tk with respect to T˜ , denoted by Π(T˜ , T1, . . . , Tk),
is a tournament (A,≻) such that A =
⋃k
i=1Bi and for all b1 ∈ Bi, b2 ∈ Bj ,
b1 ≻ b2 if and only if i = j and b1 ≻i b2, or i 6= j and i ≻˜ j.
Components can also be used to simplify the graphical representation of tournaments.
We will denote components by gray circles. Furthermore, omitted edges in figures that
depict tournaments are assumed to point downwards or from left to right by convention
(see, e.g., Figure 1).
4
2.3 Tournament Functions
A central aspect of this paper will be functions that, for a given tournament, yield one
or more subsets of alternatives. We will therefore define the notion of a tournament
function. A function on tournaments is a tournament function if it is independent of
outside alternatives and stable with respect to tournament isomorphisms. A tournament
function may yield a (non-empty) subset of alternatives—as in the case of tournament
solutions—or a set of subsets of alternatives—as in the case of qualified or stable sets.
Definition 1. Let Z ∈ {F0(X),F(X),F(F(X))}. A function f : T(X) → Z is a
tournament function if
(i) f(T ) = f(T ′) for all tournaments T = (A,≻) and T ′ = (A,≻′) such that ≻|A =
≻′|A, and
(ii) f((pi(A),≻′)) = pi(f((A,≻))) for all tournaments (A,≻), (A′,≻′), and tournament
isomorphisms2 pi : A→ A′ of (A,≻) and (A′,≻′).
For a given set B ∈ F(X) and tournament function f , we overload f by also writ-
ing f(B), provided the dominance relation is known from the context. For two tourna-
ment functions f and f ′, we write f ′ ⊆ f if f ′(T ) ⊆ f(T ) for all tournaments T .
2.4 Tournament Solutions
The first tournament function we consider is max≺ : T(X)→ F0(X), which returns the
undominated alternatives of a tournament. Formally,
max
≺
((A,≻)) = {a ∈ A | D≻(a) = ∅}.
Due to the asymmetry of the dominance relation, this function returns at most one alter-
native in any tournament. Moreover, maximal—i.e., undominated—and maximum—i.e.,
dominant—elements coincide. In social choice theory, the maximum of a majority tour-
nament is commonly referred to as the Condorcet winner. Obviously, the dominance
relation may contain cycles and thus fail to have a maximal element. For this reason,
a variety of alternative concepts to single out the “best” alternatives of a tournament
have been suggested. Formally, a tournament solution S is defined as a function that
associates with each tournament T = (A,≻) a non-empty subset S(T ) of A.
Definition 2. A tournament solution S is a tournament function S : T(X) → F(X)
such that max
≺
(T ) ⊆ S(T ) ⊆ A for all tournaments T = (A,≻).3
The set S(T ) returned by a tournament solution for a given tournament T is called
the choice set of T whereas A \ S(T ) consists of the unchosen alternatives. Since tour-
nament solutions always yield non-empty choice sets, they have to select all alternatives
in homogeneous tournaments. If S′ ⊆ S for two tournament solutions S and S′, we say
that S′ is a refinement of S or that S′ is finer than S.
2π(A) is a shorthand for the set {π(a) | a ∈ A}.
3Laslier (1997) is slightly more stringent here as he requires the maximum be the only element in S(T )
whenever it exists.
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2.5 Properties of Tournament Solutions
The literature on tournament solutions has identified a number of desirable properties
for tournament solutions. In this section, we will define six of the most common proper-
ties.4 In a more general context, Moulin (1988) distinguishes between monotonicity and
independence conditions, where a monotonicity condition describes the positive associ-
ation of the solution with some parameter and an independence condition characterizes
the invariance of the solution under the modification of some parameter.
In the context of tournament solutions, we will further distinguish between properties
that are defined in terms of the dominance relation and properties defined in terms of
the set inclusion relation. With respect to the former, we consider monotonicity and
independence of unchosen alternatives. A tournament solution is monotonic if a chosen
alternative remains in the choice set when extending its dominion and leaving everything
else unchanged.
Definition 3. A tournament solution S satisfies monotonicity (MON) if a ∈ S(T )
implies a ∈ S(T ′) for all tournaments T = (A,≻), T ′ = (A,≻′), and a ∈ A such that
≻|A\{a} = ≻
′|A\{a} and D≻(a) ⊆ D≻′(a).
A solution is independent of unchosen alternatives if the choice set is invariant under
any modification of the dominance relation between unchosen alternatives.
Definition 4. A tournament solution S is independent of unchosen alternatives (IUA)
if S(T ) = S(T ′) for all tournaments T = (A,≻) and T ′ = (A,≻′) such that D≻(a) =
D≻′(a) for all a ∈ S(T ).
With respect to set inclusion, we consider a monotonicity property to be called the
weak superset property and an independence property known as the strong superset
property. A tournament solution satisfies the weak superset property if an unchosen
alternative remains unchosen when other unchosen alternatives are removed.
Definition 5. A tournament solution S satisfies the weak superset property (WSP) if
S(B) ⊆ S(A) for all tournaments T = (A,≻) and B ⊆ A such that S(A) ⊆ B.
The strong superset property states that a choice set is invariant under the removal
of unchosen alternatives.
Definition 6. A tournament solution S satisfies the strong superset property (SSP) if
S(B) = S(A) for all tournaments T = (A,≻) and B ⊆ A such that S(A) ⊆ B.
The difference between WSP and SSP is precisely another independence condition
called idempotency. A solution is idempotent if the choice set is invariant under repeated
application of the solution concept, i.e., S(S(T )) = S(T ) for all tournaments T . When S
is not idempotent, we define Sk(T ) = S(Sk−1(T )) inductively by letting S1(T ) = S(T )
and S∞(T ) =
⋂
k∈N S
k(T ).
4Our terminology slightly differs from the one by Laslier (1997) and others. Independence of unchosen
alternatives is also called independence of the losers or independence of non-winners. The weak
superset property has been referred to as ǫ+ or the Aı¨zerman property.
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The four properties defined above (MON, IUA, WSP, and SSP) will be called basic
properties of tournament solutions. The conjunction of MON and SSP implies IUA. It is
therefore sufficient to show MON and SSP in order to prove that a tournament solution
satisfies all four basic properties.
Two further properties considered in this paper are composition-consistency and ir-
regularity. A tournament solution is composition-consistent if it chooses the “best”
alternatives from the “best” components.
Definition 7. A tournament solution S is composition-consistent (COM) if for all tour-
naments T , T1, . . . , Tk, and T˜ such that T = Π(T˜ , T1, . . . , Tk), S(T ) =
⋃
i∈S(T˜ ) S(Ti).
Finally, a tournament solution is irregular if it is capable of excluding alternatives in
regular tournaments.
Definition 8. A tournament solution S satisfies irregularity (IRR) if there exists a
regular tournament T = (A,≻) such that S(T ) 6= A.
3 Qualified Subsets
In this section, we will define a class of tournament solutions that is based on identifying
significant subtournaments of the original tournament, such as subtournaments that
admit a maximal alternative.
3.1 Concepts of Qualified Subsets
A concept of qualified subsets is a tournament function that, for a given tournament
T = (A,≻), returns subsets of A that satisfy certain properties. Each such set of sets
will be referred to as a family of qualified subsets. Two natural examples of concepts of
qualified subsets are M, which yields all subsets that admit a maximal element, and M∗,
which yields all non-empty transitive subsets. Formally,
M((A,≻)) = {B ⊆ A | max
≺
(B) 6= ∅} and
M
∗((A,≻)) = {B ⊆ A | max
≺
(C) 6= ∅ for all non-empty C ⊆ B}.
M and M∗ are examples of concepts of qualified subsets, which are formally defined
as follows.
Definition 9. Let Q : T(X) → F(F(X)) be a tournament function such that M1(T ) ⊆
Q(T ) ⊆M(T ). Q is a concept of qualified subsets if it meets the following three conditions
for every tournament T = (A,≻).
(Closure) Q(T ) is downward closed with respect to M: Let Q ∈ Q(T ). Then, Q′ ∈ Q(T )
if Q′ ⊆ Q and Q′ ∈M(T ).
(Independence) Qualified sets are independent of outside alternatives: Let A′ ∈ F(X)
and Q ⊆ A ∩A′. Then, Q ∈ Q(A) if and only if Q ∈ Q(A′).
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(Fusion) Qualified sets may be merged under certain conditions: Let Q1, Q2 ∈ Q(T ) and
Q1 \ Q2 ≻ Q2. Then Q1 ∪ Q2 ∈ Q(T ) if there is a tournament T
′ ∈ T(X) and
Q ∈ Q(T ′) such that |Q1 ∪Q2| ≤ |Q|.
Whether a set is qualified only depends on its internal structure (due to independence
and the isomorphism condition of Definition 1). While closure, independence, and the
fact that all singletons are qualified are fairly natural, the fusion condition is slightly
more technical. Essentially, it states that if a qualified subset dominates another qualified
subset, then the union of these subsets is also qualified. The additional cardinality
restriction is only required to enable bounded qualified subsets. For every concept of
qualified subsets Q and every given k ∈ N, Qk : T(X) → F(F(X)) is a tournament
function such that Qk(T ) = {B ∈ Q(T ) | |B| ≤ k}. It is easily verified that Qk is
a concept of qualified subsets. Furthermore, M and M∗ (and thus also Mk and M
∗
k)
are concepts of qualified subsets. Since only tournaments of order 4 or more may be
intransitive and admit a maximal element at the same time, Mk = M
∗
k for k ∈ {1, 2, 3}.
3.2 Maximal Elements of Maximal Qualified Subsets
For every concept of qualified subsets, we can now define a tournament solution that
yields the maximal elements of all inclusion-maximal qualified subsets, i.e., all qualified
subsets that are not contained in another qualified subset.
Definition 10. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets. Then, the tournament solution
SQ is defined as
SQ(T ) = {max
≺
(B) | B ∈ max
⊆
(Q(T ))}.
Since any family of qualified subsets contains all singletons, SQ(T ) is guaranteed to be
non-empty and contains the Condorcet winner whenever one exists. As a consequence,
SQ is well-defined as a tournament solution.
The following tournament solutions can be restated via appropriate concepts of qual-
ified subsets.
Condorcet non-losers. SM2 is arguably the largest non-trivial tournament solution. In
tournaments of order two or more, it chooses every alternative that dominates at least
one other alternative. We will refer to this concept as Condorcet non-losers (CNL) as it
selects everything except the minimum (or Condorcet loser) in such tournaments.
Uncovered set. SM(T ) returns the uncovered set UC (T ) of a tournament T , i.e., the set
consisting of the maximal elements of inclusion-maximal subsets that admit a maximal
element. The uncovered set is usually defined in terms of a subrelation of the dominance
relation called the covering relation (Fishburn, 1977; Miller, 1980).
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Banks set. SM∗(T ) yields the Banks set BA(T ) of a tournament T (Banks, 1985).
M∗(T ) contains subsets that not only admit a maximum, but can be completely ordered
from maximum to minimum such that all of their non-empty subsets admit a maximum.
SM∗(T ) thus returns the maximal elements of inclusion-maximal transitive subsets.
In the remainder of this section, we will prove various statements about tournaments
solutions defined via qualified subsets. For a set B and an alternative a 6∈ B, the short
notation [B, a] will be used to denote the set B∪{a} and the fact that max≺(B∪{a}) =
{a}. In several proofs, we will make use of the fact that whenever a 6∈ SQ(T ), there
is some b ∈ SQ(T ) for every qualified subset [Q, a] such that [Q ∪ {a}, b] ∈ Q(T ). We
start by showing that every tournament solution defined via qualified subsets satisfies
the weak superset property and monotonicity.
Proposition 1. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets. Then, SQ satisfies WSP and
MON.
Proof. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament, a 6∈ SQ(A), and A
′ ⊆ A such that SQ(T ) ∪
{a} ⊆ A′. For WSP, we need to show that a 6∈ SQ(A
′). Let [Q, a] ∈ Q(A′). Due to
independence, [Q, a] ∈ Q(A). Since a 6∈ SQ(A), there has to be some b ∈ SQ(A) such
that [Q ∪ {a}, b] ∈ Q(A). Again, independence implies that [Q ∪ {a}, b] ∈ Q(A′). Hence,
a 6∈ SQ(A
′).
For MON, observe that a ∈ SQ implies that there exists [Q, a] ∈ max⊆(Q(T )). Define
T ′ = (A,≻′) by letting T ′|A\{a} = T |A\{a} and a ≻
′ b for some b ∈ A with b ≻ a. Clearly,
[Q, a] is contained in Q(T ′) due to independence and the fact that b 6∈ Q. Now, assume
for contradiction that there is some c ∈ A such that [Q ∪ {a}, c] ∈ Q(T ′). Since a ≻′ b,
c 6= b. Independence then implies that [Q ∪ {a}, c] ∈ Q(T ), a contradiction.
Proposition 1 implies several known statements such as that CNL, UC , and BA satisfy
MON and WSP. All three concepts are known to fail idempotency (and thus SSP). CNL
trivially satisfies IUA whereas this is not the case for UC and BA (see Laslier, 1997).
We also obtain some straightforward inclusion relationships, which define an infinite
hierarchy of tournament solutions ranging from CNL to BA.
Proposition 2. SM∗ ⊆ SM, SM∗
k
⊆ SMk , SQk+1 ⊆ SQk , and SQ ⊆ SQk for every concept
of qualified subsets Q and k ∈ N.
Proof. All inclusion relationships follow from the following observation. Let T be a
tournament and Q and Q′ concepts of qualified subsets such that for every [Q, a] ∈
max⊆(Q(T )), there is [Q
′, a] ∈ max⊆(Q
′(T )). Then, SQ ⊆ SQ′ .
It turns out that the Banks set is the finest tournament solution definable via qualified
subsets. In order to show this, we introduce a new property called strong retentiveness
that prescribes that the choice set of every dominator set is contained in the original
choice set. Alternatively, it can be seen as a variant of WSP because it states that a
choice set may not grow when an alternative and its entire dominion are removed from
the tournament.
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Definition 11. A tournament solution S satisfies strong retentiveness if S(D(a)) ⊆
S(A) for all tournaments T = (A,≻) and a ∈ A.
Lemma 1. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets. Then, SQ satisfies strong retentive-
ness.
Proof. Let (A,≻) be a tournament, a ∈ A an alternative, and B = D(a). We show
that b ∈ SQ(B) implies that b ∈ SQ(A). Let [Q, b] be a maximal qualified subset in B,
i.e., [Q, b] ∈ max⊆(Q(B)). If [Q, b] ∈ max⊆(Q(A)), we are done. Otherwise, there has
to be some c ∈ A such that [Q ∪ {b}, c] ∈ Q(A). Furthermore, [Q, b] ≻ a and a ≻ c
because otherwise [Q ∪ {b}, c] would be qualified in B as well. We can now merge the
qualified subsets [Q, b] and [{a}, b] according to the fusion condition. We claim that
[Q∪{a}, b] ∈ max⊆(Q(A)). Assume for contradiction that there is some d ∈ A such that
[Q∪ {a, b}, d] ∈ Q(A). Since d ∈ D(a), independence implies that [Q ∪ {a, b}, d] ∈ Q(B).
This is a contradiction because [Q, b] was assumed to be a maximal qualified subset
of B.
Theorem 1. The Banks set is the finest tournament solution satisfying strong reten-
tiveness and thus the finest tournament solution definable via qualified subsets.
Proof. Let S be a tournament solution that satisfies strong retentiveness and T = (A,≻)
a tournament. We first show that BA(A) ⊆ S(A). For every a ∈ BA(A), there has
to be maximal transitive set [Q, a] ⊆ A. Let Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}. We show that
B =
⋂n
i=1D(qi) = {a}. Since a ≻ Q, a ∈ B. Assume for contradiction that b ∈ B
with b 6= a. Then b ≻ Q and either [Q ∪ {b}, a] or [Q ∪ {a}, b] is a transitive set,
which contradicts the maximality of [Q, a]. Since S(B) = S({a}) = {a}, the repeated
application of strong retentiveness implies that a ∈ S(A). The statement now follows
from Lemma 1.
4 Stable Sets
In this section, we propose a general method for refining any suitable solution concept S
by formalizing the stability of sets of alternatives with respect to S. This method is
based on the notion of stable sets (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944) and generalizes
covering sets as introduced by Dutta (1988).
4.1 Stability and Directedness
The reason why we are interested in maximal—i.e., undominated—alternatives is that
dominated alternatives can be upset by other alternatives; they are unstable. The ra-
tionale behind stable sets is that this instability is only meaningful if an alternative is
upset by something which itself is stable. Hence, a set of alternatives B is said to be
stable if it consists precisely of those alternatives not upset by B. In von Neumann and
Morgenstern’s original definition, a is upset by B if some element of B dominates a.
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In our generalization, a is upset by B if a 6∈ S(B ∪ {a}) for some underlying solution
concept S.5
As an alternative to this fixed-point definition, which will be formalized in Corollary 1,
stable sets can be seen as sets that comply with internal and external stability in some
well-defined way. First, there should be no reason to restrict the selection by exclud-
ing some alternative from it and, secondly, there should be an argument against each
proposal to include an outside alternative into the selection.6 In our context, external
stability with respect to some tournament solution S is defined as follows.
Definition 12. Let S be a tournament solution and T = (A,≻) a tournament. Then,
B ⊆ A is externally stable in T with respect to tournament solution S (or S-stable)
if a /∈ S(B ∪ {a}) for all a ∈ A \ B. The set of S-stable sets for a given tournament
T = (A,≻) will be denoted by SS(T ) = {B ⊆ A | B is S-stable in T}.
Externally stable sets are guaranteed to exist since the set of all alternatives A is
trivially S-stable in (A,≻) for every S. We say that a set B ⊆ A is internally stable
with respect to S if S(B) = B. We will focus on external stability for now because we
will see later that certain conditions imply the existence of a unique minimal externally
stable set, which also satisfies internal stability. We define Ŝ(T ) to be the tournament
solution that returns the union of all inclusion-minimal S-stable sets in T , i.e., the union
of all S-stable sets that do not contain an S-stable set as a proper subset.
Definition 13. Let S be a tournament solution. Then, the tournament solution Ŝ is
defined as
Ŝ(T ) =
⋃
min
⊆
(SS(T )).
It is easily verified that Ŝ is well-defined as a tournament solution as there are no S-
stable sets that do not contain the Condorcet winner whenever one exists. We will only
be concerned with tournament solutions S that (presumably) admit a unique minimal
S-stable set in any tournament. It turns out it is precisely this property that is most
difficult to prove for all but the simplest tournament solutions. A tournament T contains
a unique minimal S-stable set if and only if SS(T ) is a directed set with respect to set
inclusion, i.e., for all sets B,C ∈ SS(T ) there is a set D ∈ SS(T ) contained in both B
and C. We say that SS is directed when SS(T ) is a directed set for all tournaments T .
Throughout this paper, directedness of a set of sets S is shown by proving the stronger
property of closure under intersection, i.e., B ∩ C ∈ S for all B,C ∈ S. A set of sets S
pairwise intersects if B∩C 6= ∅ for all B,C ∈ S. We will prove that, for every concept of
qualified subsets Q, SSQ is closed under intersection if and only if SSQ pairwise intersects.
In order to improve readability, we will use the short notation SQ for SSQ .
5Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s definition can be seen as the special case where a is upset by B if
a 6∈ max≺(B ∪ {a}).
6A large number of solution concepts in the social sciences spring from similar notions of internal
and/or external stability (see, e.g., von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944; Nash, 1951; Shapley, 1964;
Schwartz, 1986; Dutta, 1988; Basu and Weibull, 1991; Duggan and Le Breton, 1996). Wilson (1970)
refers to stability as the solution property.
11
Lemma 2. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets. Then, SQ is closed under intersection
if and only if SQ pairwise intersects.
Proof. The direction from left to right is straightforward since the empty set is not
stable. The opposite direction is shown by contraposition, i.e., we prove that SQ does
not pairwise intersect if SQ is not closed under intersection. Let T = (A,≻) be a
tournament and B1, B2 ∈ SQ(T ) be two sets such that C = B1 ∩ B2 6∈ SQ(T ). Since C
is not SQ-stable, there has to be a ∈ A \ C such that a ∈ SQ(C ∪ {a}). In other words,
there has to be a set Q ⊆ C such that [Q, a] ∈ max⊆(Q(C ∪ {a})). Define
B′1 = {b ∈ B1 | b ≻ Q} and B
′
2 = {b ∈ B2 | b ≻ Q}.
Clearly, (B′1 \ B
′
2) ∩ C = ∅ and (B
′
2 \ B
′
1) ∩ C = ∅. Assume without loss of generality
that a 6∈ B1. It follows from the stability of B1, that B1 has to contain an alternative b1
such that b1 ≻ [Q, a]. Hence, B
′
1 is not empty. Next, we show that B
′
1∩B
′
2 = ∅. Assume
for contradiction that there is some b ∈ B′1 ∩ B
′
2. If b ≻ a, independence implies that
[Q ∪ {a}, b] ∈ Q(C ∪ {a}), which contradicts the fact that [Q, a] is a maximal qualified
subset in C ∪ {a}. If, on the other hand, a ≻ b, the set [Q ∪ {b}, a] is isomorphic to
[Q ∪ {a}, b1], which is a qualified subset of B1 ∪ {a}. Thus, [Q ∪ {b}, a] ∈ Q(C ∪ {a}),
again contradicting the maximality of [Q, a]. Independence, the isomorphism of [Q, a]
and [Q, b1], and the stability of B2 further require that there has to be an alternative
b2 ∈ B2 such that b2 ≻ [Q, b1]. Hence, B
′
1 and B
′
2 are disjoint and non-empty.
Let a′ ∈ B′2 and R be a maximal subset of B
′
1∪Q such that [R, a
′] ∈ Q(B′1∪Q∪{a
′}).
We claim that Q has to be contained in R. Assume for contradiction that there exists
some b ∈ Q \ R. Clearly, [Q, a] and [Q, a′] are isomorphic. It therefore follows from
independence that [Q, a′] ∈ Q(B′1 ∪Q ∪ {a
′}) and from closure that [(Q ∩R)∪ {b}, a′] ∈
Q(B′1 ∪ Q ∪ {a
′}). Due to the stability of B1, [R, a
′] is not a maximal qualified subset
in B1 ∪ {a
′}, i.e., there exists a qualified subset that contains more elements. We may
thus merge the qualified subsets [R, a′] and [(Q ∩ R) ∪ {b}, a′] according to the fusion
condition because R\Q ≻ Q and consequently R\Q ≻ (Q∩R)∪{b}. We then have that
[R ∪ {b}, a′] ∈ Q(B′1 ∪ Q ∪ {a
′}), which yields a contradiction because R was assumed
to be a maximal set such that [R, a′] ∈ Q(B′1 ∪ Q ∪ {a
′}). Hence, Q ⊆ R. Due to the
stability of B1 in T , there has to be a c ∈ B1 such that c ≻ [R, a
′]. Since B′1 contains all
alternatives in B1 that dominate Q ⊆ R, it also contains c. Independence then implies
that [R, a′] 6∈ max⊆(Qk(B
′
1 ∪Q ∪ {a
′})).
Thus, B′1 ∪ Q is stable in B
′
1 ∪ B
′
2 ∪ Q. Since Q is contained in every maximal set
R ⊆ B′1 ∪ Q such that [R, a
′] ∈ Q(B′1 ∪ Q ∪ {a
′}) for some a′ ∈ B′2, B
′
1 (and by an
analogous argument B′2) remains stable when removing Q. This completes the proof
because B′1 and B
′
2 are two disjoint SQ-stable sets in B
′
1 ∪B
′
2.
Dutta has shown by induction on the tournament order that tournaments admit no
disjoint SM-stable sets (so-called covering sets).
Theorem 2 (Dutta, 1988). SM pairwise intersects.
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Dutta (1988) also showed that covering sets are closed under intersection, which now
also follows from Lemma 2.7
Naturally, finer solution concepts also yield smaller minimal stable sets (if their unique-
ness is guaranteed).
Proposition 3. Let S and S′ be two tournament solutions such that SS′ is directed and
S′ ⊆ S. Then, Ŝ′ ⊆ Ŝ and SS pairwise intersects.
Proof. The statements follow from the simple fact that every S-stable set is also S′-
stable. Let B ⊆ A be a minimal S-stable set in tournament (A,≻). Then, a 6∈ S(B∪{a})
for every a ∈ A\B and, due to the inclusion relationship, a 6∈ S′(B∪{a}) ⊆ S(B∪{a}).
As a consequence, B is S′-stable and has to contain the unique minimal S′-stable set
since SS′ is directed. SS pairwise intersects because two disjoint S-stable sets would also
be S′-stable, which contradicts the directedness of SS′ .
As a corollary of the previous statements, the set of SMk -stable sets for every k is
closed under intersection.
Theorem 3. SMk is closed under intersection for all k ∈ N.
Proof. Let k ∈ N. We know from Proposition 2 that SM ⊆ SMk and from Theorem 2
and Lemma 2 that SM is directed. Proposition 3 implies that SMk pairwise intersects.
The statement then straightforwardly follows from Lemma 2.
Interestingly, SM2 , the set of all dominant sets, is not only closed under intersection,
but in fact totally ordered with respect to set inclusion.
We conjecture that the set of all SM∗-stable sets also pairwise intersects and thus
admits a unique minimal element. However, the combinatorial structure of transitive
subtournaments within tournaments is extraordinarily rich (see, e.g., Woeginger, 2003;
Gaspers and Mnich, 2010) and it seems that a proof of the conjecture would be signif-
icantly more difficult than Dutta’s. As will be shown in Section 5, the conjecture that
SM∗-stable sets pairwise intersect is a weakened version of a conjecture by Schwartz
(1990).
Conjecture 1. SM∗ is closed under intersection.
Using Lemma 2, the conjecture entails that SM∗
k
for all k ∈ N is also closed under
intersection. Since tournaments with less than four alternatives may not contain a
maximal element and a cycle at the same time, this trivially holds for k ≤ 3. The
weakest version of Conjecture 1 that is no implied by Theorem 2 is that SM∗4 is closed
under intersection. We were able to show this by reducing it to a large, but finite,
number of cases that were checked using a computer. Unfortunately, this exercise did
not yield any insight on how to prove Conjecture 1.
Two well-known examples of minimal stable sets are the top cycle of a tournament,
which is the minimal stable set with respect to SM2 , and the minimal covering set, which
is the minimal stable set with respect to SM.
7As Dutta’s definition requires a stable set to be internally and externally stable, he actually proves
that the intersection of any pair of coverings sets contains a covering set. A simpler proof, which
shows that externally SM-stable sets are closed under intersection, is given by Laslier (1997).
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Minimal dominant set. The minimal dominant set (or top cycle) of a tournament
T = (A,≻) is given by TC (T ) = ŜM2(T ) = ĈNL, i.e., it is the smallest set B such that
B ≻ A \B (Good, 1971; Smith, 1973).
Minimal covering set. The minimal covering set of a tournament T is given by
MC (T ) = ŜM(T ) = ÛC , i.e., it is the smallest set B such that for all a ∈ A \ B, there
exists b ∈ B so that every alternative in B that is dominated by a is also dominated
by b (Dutta, 1988).
The proposed methodology also suggests the definition of a new tournament solution
that has not been considered before in the literature.
Minimal extending set. The minimal extending set of a tournament T is given by
ME(T ) = ŜM∗(T ) = B̂A, i.e., it is the smallest set B such that no a ∈ A \ B is the
maximal element of a maximal transitive subset in B ∪ {a}.
The minimal extending set will be further analyzed in Section 4.3.
4.2 Properties of Minimal Stable Sets
If SS is directed—and we will only be concerned with tournament solutions S for which
this is (presumably) the case—Ŝ satisfies a number of desirable properties.
Proposition 4. Let S be a tournament solution such that SS is directed. Then, Ŝ
satisfies WSP and IUA.
Proof. Clearly, any minimal S-stable set B remains S-stable when losing alternatives are
removed or when edges between losing alternatives are modified. In the latter case, B
also remains minimal. In the former case, the minimal S-stable set is contained in B.
It can be shown that sets that are stable within a stable set are also stable in the
original tournament when the underlying tournament solution is defined via a concept
of qualified subsets Q. This lemma will prove very useful when analyzing ŜQ.
Lemma 3. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament and Q a concept of qualified subsets. Then,
SQ(B) ⊆ SQ(A) for all B ∈ SQ(A).
Proof. We prove the statement by showing that the following implication holds for all
B ⊆ A, C ∈ SQ(B), and a ∈ A:
if a 6∈ SQ(B ∪ {a}) then a 6∈ SQ(C ∪ {a}).
To see this, let a 6∈ SQ(B ∪ {a}) and assume for contradiction that there exist [Q, a] ∈
max⊆ Q(C ∪ {a}). Then there has to be b ∈ B such that [Q ∪ {a}, b] ∈ Q(B ∪ {a})
because [Q, a] 6∈ max⊆ Q(B ∪ {a}). Now, if b ∈ C, closure and independence imply that
[Q ∪ {a}, b] ∈ Q(C ∪ {a}), contradicting the maximality of [Q, a]. If, on the other hand,
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b ∈ B \ C, then there has to be c ∈ C such that [Q ∪ {b}, c] ∈ Q(C ∪ {b}). No matter
whether c ≻ a or a ≻ c, Q ∪ {a, c} is isomorphic to [Q ∪ {b}, c] and thus also a qualified
subset, which again contradicts the assumption that [Q, a] was maximal.
We are now ready to show a number of appealing properties of unique minimal stable
sets when the underlying solution concept is defined via qualified subsets.
Theorem 4. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets such that SQ is directed. Then,
(i) ŜQ ⊆ S
∞
Q
,
(ii) SQ(ŜQ(T )∪{a}) = ŜQ(T ) for all tournaments T = (A,≻) and a ∈ A (in particular,
ŜQ(T ) is internally stable),
(iii) ŜQ satisfies SSP, and
(iv)
̂̂
SQ = ŜQ.
Proof. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament. The first statement of the theorem is shown by
proving by induction on k that Sk
Q
(T ) is an SQ-stable set. For the basis, let B = SQ(T ).
Then, SQ(B ∪ {a}) ⊆ B for every a ∈ A \B due to WSP of SQ (Proposition 1) and thus
B is SQ-stable. Now, assume that B = S
k
Q
(T ) is SQ-stable and let C = SQ(B). Again,
WSP implies that a 6∈ SQ(C ∪ {a}) for every a ∈ B \ C, i.e., C ∈ SQ(B). We can thus
directly apply Lemma 3 to obtain that C = Sk+1
Q
(T ) ∈ SQ(T ). As the minimal SQ-stable
set is contained in every SQ-stable set, the statement follows.
Regarding internal stability, assume for contradiction that SQ(ŜQ(T )) ⊂ ŜQ(T ). How-
ever, Lemma 3 implies that SQ(ŜQ(T )) is SQ-stable, contradicting the minimality of
ŜQ(T ). The remainder of the second statement follows straightforwardly from internal
stability. If SQ(ŜQ(T ) ∪ {a}) = C ⊂ ŜQ(T ) for some a ∈ A \ ŜQ(T ), WSP implies that
SQ(ŜQ(T )) ⊆ C, contradicting internal stability.
Regarding SSP, let B = ŜQ(T ) and assume for contradiction that C = ŜQ(A
′) ⊂ B
for some A′ with B ⊆ A′ ⊂ A. Clearly, C is SQ-stable not only in A
′ but also in B,
which implies that C ∈ SQ(B). According to Lemma 3, C is also contained in SQ(A),
contradicting the minimality of ŜQ(T ).
Finally, for
̂̂
SQ(T ) = ŜQ(T ), we show that every SQ-stable set is ŜQ-stable and that
every minimal ŜQ-stable set is SQ-stable set. The former follows from ŜQ(T ) ⊆ SQ(T ),
which is a consequence of the first statement of this theorem. For the latter statement,
let B ∈ min⊆(SŜQ(T )). We first show that ŜQ(B ∪ {a}) = B for all a ∈ A \ B. Assume
for contradiction that ŜQ(B ∪ {a}) = C ⊂ B for some a ∈ A \ B. Since ŜQ satisfies
SSP, ŜQ(B ∪ {a}) = C for all a ∈ A \ B. As a consequence, C is ŜQ-stable in B ∪ {a}
for all a ∈ A \ B and, due to the definition of stability, also in A. This contradicts
the assumption that B was the minimal Ŝ-stable set. Hence, ŜQ(B ∪ {a}) = B for all
a ∈ A \ B. By definition of ŜQ, this implies that a 6∈ SQ(B ∪ {a}) and thus that B is
SQ-stable.
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The second statement of Theorem 4 allows us to characterize stable sets using the
fixed-point formulation mentioned at the beginning of this section, which unifies internal
and external stability.
Corollary 1. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets such that SQ is directed and T =
(A,≻) a tournament. Then,
ŜQ(T ) = min
⊆
{B ⊆ A | B =
⋃
a∈A
SQ(B ∪ {a})}.
There may very well be more than one internally and externally SQ-stable set in a
tournament. For example, the proof of Theorem 4 implies that S∞
Q
(T ) is internally and
externally SQ-stable.
We have already seen that ŜQ satisfies some of the basic properties defined in Sec-
tion 2.5. It further turns out that Ŝ inherits monotonicity and composition-consistency
from S.
Proposition 5. Let S be a tournament solution such that SS is directed and S satisfies
MON. Then, Ŝ satisfies MON as well.
Proof. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament with a, b ∈ A, a ∈ Ŝ(T ), and b ≻ a, and let the
relation ≻′ be identical to ≻ except that a ≻′ b. Denote T ′ = (A,≻′) and assume for
contradiction that a 6∈ Ŝ(T ′). Then, there has to be a minimal S-stable set B ⊆ A \ {a}
in T ′. We show that B is also S-stable in T , a contradiction. If b 6∈ B, this would clearly
be the case because Ŝ satisfies IUA. If, on the other hand, b ∈ B, the only reason for
B not to be S-stable in T is that a ∈ S((B ∪ {a}),≻). However, monotonicity of S
then implies that a ∈ S((B ∪ {a}),≻′), which is a contradiction because B is S-stable
in T ′.
Proposition 6. Let S be a tournament solution that satisfies COM. Then, Ŝ satisfies
COM as well.
Proof. Let S be a composition-consistent tournament solution and T = (A,≻) =
Π(T˜ , T1, . . . , Tk) a product tournament with T = ({1, . . . , k}, ≻˜), T1 = (B1,≻1), . . . ,
Tk = (Bk,≻k). For a subset C of A, let Ci = C ∩ Bi for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k} and
C˜ =
⋃
i : Ci 6=∅
{i}. We will prove that C ⊆ A is S-stable if and only if
(i) C˜ is S-stable in T˜ , and
(ii) Ci is S-stable in Ti for all i ∈ {1, . . . , k}.
Consider an arbitrary alternative a ∈ A \ C. For C to be S-stable, a should not be
contained in S(C ∪ {a}). Since S is composition-consistent, a may be excluded for two
reasons. First, a may be contained in an unchosen component, i.e., a ∈ Bi such that
i 6∈ S(C˜ ∪ {i}). Secondly, a may not be selected despite being in a chosen component,
i.e., a ∈ Bi such that i ∈ S(C˜ ∪ {i}) and a 6∈ S(Ci ∪ {a}). This directly establishes the
claim above and consequently that Ŝ is composition-consistent.
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The previous propositions and theorems allow us to deduce several known statements
about TC and MC , in particular that both concepts satisfy all basic properties and that
MC is a refinement of UC∞ and satisfies COM.
We conclude this section by generalizing the axiomatization of the minimal covering
set (Dutta, 1988) to abstract minimal stable sets. One of the cornerstones of the axiom-
atization is S-exclusivity, which prescribes under which circumstances a single element
may be dismissed from the choice set.8
Definition 14. A tournament solution S′ satisfies S-exclusivity if, for every tournament
T = (A,≻), S′(T ) = A \ {a} implies that a 6∈ S(A).
If S always admits a unique minimal S-stable set and Ŝ satisfies SSP, which is always
the case if S is defined via qualified subsets, then Ŝ can be characterized by SSP, S-
exclusivity, and inclusion-minimality.
Proposition 7. Let S be a tournament solution such that SS is directed and Ŝ satisfies
SSP. Then, Ŝ is the finest tournament solution satisfying SSP and S-exclusivity.
Proof. Let S be a tournament solution as desired and S′ a tournament solution that
satisfies SSP and S-exclusivity. We first prove that Ŝ ⊆ S′ by showing that S′(T ) is
S-stable for every tournament T = (A,≻). Let B = S′(T ) and a ∈ A\B. It follows from
SSP that S′(B ∪ {a}) = B and from S-exclusivity that a 6∈ S(B ∪ {a}), which implies
that B is S-stable. Since Ŝ(T ) is the unique inclusion-minimal S-stable set, it has to be
contained in all S-stable sets. The statement now follows from the fact that Ŝ satisfies
SSP and S-exclusivity.
Hence, TC is the finest tournament solution satisfying SSP and CNL-exclusivity, MC
is the finest tournament solution satisfying SSP and UC -exclusivity, andME is the finest
tournament solution satisfying SSP and BA-exclusivity if Conjecture 1 holds.
4.3 The Minimal Extending Set
As mentioned in Section 4.1, the minimal extending set is a new tournament solution
that has not been considered before. In analogy to UC -stable sets, which are known
as covering sets, we will call BA-stable sets extending sets. B is an extending set of
tournament T = (A,≻) if, for all a 6∈ B, every transitive path (or so-called Banks
trajectory) in B∪{a} with maximal element a can be extended, i.e., there is b ∈ B such
that b dominates every element on the path. In other words, B ⊆ A is an extending set
if for all a ∈ A \B, a /∈ BA(B ∪ {a}).
If Conjecture 1 is correct, ME satisfies all properties defined in Section 2.5 and is a re-
finement of BA due to Propositions 4 and 5 and Theorem 4. Assuming that Conjecture 1
holds, Proposition 3 furthermore implies that ME is a refinement of MC since every cov-
ering set is also an extending set. We refer to Figure 1 for an example tournament T
where ME(T ) happens to be strictly contained in MC (T ).9
8UC -exclusivity is the property γ∗∗ used in the axiomatization of MC (Laslier, 1997).
9This is also the case for a tournament of order eight given by Dutta (1990).
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a1 a2
a3
a4 a5
a6
a7 a8
a9
a10
Figure 1: Example tournament T = (A,≻) where MC and ME differ (MC (T ) = A and
ME(T ) = A \ {a10}). a10 only dominates a3, a6, and a9.
A remarkable property of ME is that, just like BA, it is capable of ruling out alter-
natives in regular tournaments, i.e., it satisfies IRR. No irregular tournament solution
is known to satisfy all four basic properties. However, if Conjecture 1 were true, ME
would be such a concept.
5 Retentiveness and Stability
Motivated by cooperative majority voting, Schwartz (1990) introduced a tournament
solution based on a notion he calls retentiveness. It turns out that retentiveness bears
some similarities to stability. For example, the top cycle can be represented as a minimal
stable set as well as a minimal retentive set, albeit using different underlying tournament
solutions.
5.1 The Tournament Equilibrium Set
The intuition underlying retentive sets is that alternative a is only “properly” dominated
by alternative b if b is chosen among a’s dominators by some underlying tournament
solution S. A set of alternatives is then called S-retentive if none of its elements is
properly dominated by some outside alternative with respect to S.10
Definition 15. Let S be a tournament solution and T = (A,≻) a tournament. Then,
B ⊆ A is retentive in T with respect to tournament solution S (or S-retentive) if B 6= ∅
and S(D(b)) ⊆ B for all b ∈ B such that D(b) 6= ∅. The set of S-retentive sets for a given
tournament T = (A,≻) will be denoted by RS(T ) = {B ⊆ A | B is S-retentive in T}.
10In analogy to the discussion at the beginning of Section 4.1, a set of alternatives B may be called
retentive if it consists precisely of those alternatives not upset by B. Here, a is upset by B if
a 6∈
⋃
b∈B
S(D(b)) for some underlying solution concept S.
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S-retentive sets are guaranteed to exist since the set of all alternatives A is trivially
S-retentive in (A,≻) for all tournament solutions S. In analogy to Definition 13, the
union of minimal S-retentive sets defines a tournament solution.
Definition 16. Let S be a tournament solution. Then, the tournament solution S˚ is
defined as
S˚(T ) =
⋃
min
⊆
(RS(T )).
It is easily verified that S˚ is well-defined as a tournament solution as there are no
S-retentive sets that do not contain the Condorcet winner whenever one exists.
As an example, consider the tournament solution SM1 that always returns all alter-
natives, i.e., SM1((A,≻)) = A. The unique minimal retentive set with respect to SM1 is
the top cycle, that is TC = ŜM2 = S˚M1 .
Schwartz introduced retentiveness in order to recursively define the tournament equi-
librium set (TEQ) as the union of minimal TEQ-retentive sets. This recursion is well-
defined because the order of the dominator set of any alternative is strictly smaller than
the order of the original tournament.
Definition 17 (Schwartz, 1990). The tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) of a tourna-
ment T is defined recursively as TEQ(T ) = ˚TEQ(T ).
In other words, TEQ is the unique fixed point of the ◦-operator.
Schwartz conjectured that every tournament admits a unique minimal TEQ-retentive
set. Despite several attempts to prove or disprove this statement (e.g., Laffond et al.,
1993a; Houy, 2009), the statement has remained a conjecture. A recent computer anal-
ysis failed to find a counter-example in all tournaments of order 12 or less and a fairly
large number of random tournaments (Brandt et al., 2010).
Conjecture 2 (Schwartz, 1990). RTEQ is directed.
It is easily appreciated that the non-empty intersection of two S-retentive sets is
also S-retentive. As a consequence, Conjecture 2 is equivalent to the statement that
there are no two disjoint TEQ-retentive sets in any tournament. Unfortunately, and
somewhat surprisingly, it is not known whether TEQ satisfies any of the basic properties
defined in Section 2.5. However, Laffond et al. (1993a) and Houy (2009) have shown that
TEQ satisfies any of the basic properties if and only if RTEQ is directed, and is strictly
contained in MC if RTEQ is directed. We will strengthen the last statement by showing
that TEQ is also strictly contained in ME if RTEQ is directed.
5.2 Inclusion of TEQ in ME
In Section 3.2, the Banks set was characterized as the finest tournament solution sat-
isfying strong retentiveness. It turns out that, if RTEQ is directed, TEQ is the finest
tournament solution satisfying a very natural weakening of strong retentiveness, where
the inclusion of the choice sets of dominator sets is only required to hold for alternatives
contained in the original choice set.
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Definition 18. A tournament solution S satisfies (weak) retentiveness if S(D(a)) ⊆
S(T ) for all tournaments T and a ∈ S(T ).
In other words, a tournament solution S satisfies retentiveness if and only if S(T ) is S-
retentive for all tournaments T . It follows from Schwartz’s axiomatization of TEQ that
TEQ is the finest tournament solution satisfying retentiveness, given that Conjecture 2
is true.
Theorem 5 (Schwartz, 1990). TEQ is the finest tournament solution satisfying reten-
tiveness if RTEQ is directed.
The fact that SQ satisfies strong retentiveness for every concept of qualified subsets
Q can be used to show that every SQ-stable set is ŜQ-retentive, which has a number of
useful consequences.
Lemma 4. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets such that SSQ is directed for all
tournaments of order n or less. Then, SSQ(T ) ⊆ RŜQ(T ) for all tournaments T of order
n+ 1.
Proof. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament of order n + 1, B ∈ SSQ(T ), b ∈ B, and
C = DB(b). We show that C is SQ-stable in D(b). Let a ∈ D(b) \ B and consider the
tournament restricted to C ∪ {a}. We know from B’s stability that SQ(B ∪ {a}) ⊆ B.
Furthermore, since SQ satisfies strong retentiveness (Lemma 1), SQ(C ∪{a}) ⊆ C, which
shows that C is SQ-stable in C ∪ {a}. C ∪ {a} is of order n or less. Hence, there is a
unique minimal SQ-stable set in C ∪ {a}, which is contained in C.
Theorem 6. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets. Then,
(i) ŜQ satisfies retentiveness if SQ is directed,
(ii) SQ is directed if RTEQ is directed, and
(iii) TEQ ⊆ ŜQ if RTEQ is directed.
Proof. We prove all statements simultaneously by induction on the tournament order n.
The basis is straightforward. Now, assume that all three implications hold for tourna-
ments of order n or less. If SQ is directed for tournaments of order n+ 1 or less, we can
apply Lemma 4 to show that every SQ-stable set is ŜQ-retentive in such tournaments.
Hence, ŜQ satisfies retentiveness and the first statement holds for tournaments of order
n+ 1.
For the second statement, assume for contradiction that there is a tournament T =
(A,≻) of order n + 1 that contains two disjoint SQ-stable sets B1 and B2 (while SQ is
directed for all tournaments of order n or less and RTEQ is directed for all tournaments
of order n + 1 or less, including T ). It follows from Lemma 4 that B1 and B2 are also
ŜQ-retentive. Moreover, the induction hypothesis of the third statement implies that
TEQ(D(a)) ⊆ ŜQ(D(a)) for all a ∈ A, which implies that B1 and B2 are TEQ-retentive,
a contradiction.
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In order to show the third statement, let RTEQ be directed for tournaments of order
n + 1 or less. It follows from the second implication that SQ of such tournaments is
directed as well and from the first that ŜQ satisfies retentiveness for such tournaments.
We know from Theorem 5 that TEQ is contained in all tournament solutions that satisfy
retentiveness. Hence, TEQ(T ) ⊆ ŜQ(T ) for all tournaments of order n+ 1.
In other words, TC and MC satisfy retentiveness and ME satisfies retentiveness if
Conjecture 1 holds. Furthermore, Conjecture 2 is at least as strong as Conjecture 1.
Similarly, the directedness of SM, which was proved by Dutta (1988) (see Theorem 2),
also follows from Conjecture 2. Finally, given that Conjecture 2 holds, TEQ is a re-
finement of all tournament solutions ŜQ where Q is a concept of qualified subsets. In
particular, we have the following.
Corollary 2. TEQ ⊆ ME if RTEQ is directed
The remaining question is whether TEQ and ME are actually different solution con-
cepts. The tournament given in Figure 2 demonstrates that this is indeed the case.
a1 a2 a3 a4 a5 a6 a7 a8
Figure 2: Example tournament T = (A,≻) where ME and TEQ differ (ME(T ) = A
and TEQ(T ) = A \ {a5}). In particular, A \ {a5} is no extending set since
a5 ∈ BA(A) via the non-extendable transitive set {a5, a6, a7, a8}.
5.3 TEQ as a Minimal Stable Set
A natural question is whether TEQ itself can be represented as a minimal stable set.
The following two lemmas establish that this is indeed the case if RTEQ is directed. We
first show that every S-retentive set is S˚-stable if S satisfies WSP for strictly smaller
tournaments.
Lemma 5. Let S be a tournament solution that satisfies WSP for all tournaments of
order n or less. Then, RS(T ) ⊆ SS˚(T ) for all tournaments T of order n+ 1.
Proof. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament or order n + 1 and B an S-retentive set in A.
If B = A, the statement is trivially satisfied. Otherwise, let a ∈ A \ B. We first show
that B is S-retentive in B ∪{a}. Let b be an arbitrary alternative in B. S-retentiveness
implies S(D(b)) ⊆ B and WSP implies S(DB∪{a}(b)) ⊆ S(D(b)). As a consequence,
S(DB∪{a}(b)) ⊆ B, and thus B is S-retentive in B ∪ {a}. It remains to be shown
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that a is not contained in another minimal S-retentive subset of B ∪ {a}. Assume for
contradiction that a is contained in some minimal S-retentive set. If {a} itself were an
S-retentive set, a would be the Condorcet winner in B∪{a}, contradicting the fact that
B is S-retentive in B ∪ {a}. Now let C ⊂ B ∪ {a} with a ∈ C and |C| > 1 be a minimal
S-retentive set. This implies that B∩C is also S-retentive, contradicting the minimality
of C. It follows that B is S˚-stable.
The next lemma shows that every every TEQ-stable set is also TEQ-retentive, as-
suming the directedness of RTEQ .
Lemma 6. STEQ ⊆ RTEQ if RTEQ is directed.
Proof. We prove the statement by induction on the tournament order n. We may assume
that RTEQ is directed for all tournaments of order n + 1 or less and that STEQ ⊆
RTEQ for all tournaments of order n or less. Let T = (A,≻) be a tournament of
order n + 1 and B ⊆ A a TEQ-stable set in T . In other words, if we let A \ B =
{a1, . . . , ak}, then TEQ(B ∪ {ai}) ⊆ B for all 1 ≤ i ≤ k. Now, in order to show that
B is TEQ-retentive, consider an arbitrary b ∈ B and let C = DB(b). By definition of
TEQ , TEQ(C ∪ {ai}) ⊆ C for all ai ∈ DA\B(b), i.e., C is TEQ-stable in D(b). Since
STEQ (D(b)) ⊆ RTEQ(D(b)), C is also TEQ-retentive inD(b) and, due to the directedness
of RTEQ(D(b)), TEQ(D(b)) ⊆ C. Hence, B is TEQ-retentive in T .
We have now cleared the ground for the main result of this section.
Theorem 7. STEQ is directed if and only if RTEQ is directed. TEQ = T̂EQ if RTEQ is
directed.
Proof. We first prove the following two implications by induction on the tournament
order n: (i) if RTEQ is directed, then TEQ satisfies WSP and RTEQ ⊆ STEQ ; (ii) if
STEQ is directed, then RTEQ is directed.
The basis is straightforward. Assume that both implications hold for tournaments of
order n and let T = (A,≻) be a tournament of order n + 1. In order to prove the first
statement, assume that RTEQ is directed for all tournaments of order n + 1 or less and
let B ⊆ A such that TEQ(T ) ⊆ B. The induction hypothesis implies that TEQ satisfies
WSP in all dominator sets D(a) for a ∈ A. Hence, TEQ(T ) is TEQ-retentive in B and,
due to the directedness of RTEQ(T ), TEQ(B) ⊆ TEQ(T ). Moreover, Lemma 5 shows
that RTEQ(T ) ⊆ STEQ(T ) since TEQ = ˚TEQ by definition.
For the second statement, assume that STEQ is directed for tournaments of order n+1
or less. It follows from the induction hypothesis that RTEQ is directed for tournaments of
order n or less and from the induction hypothesis of the first statement that TEQ satisfies
WSP in these tournaments. Now, assume for contradiction that there two disjoint TEQ-
retentive sets in T . According to Lemma 5, these sets are also TEQ-stable, which
contradicts the directedness of STEQ (T ).
Finally, assume that RTEQ is directed. The first statement and Lemma 6 establish
that RTEQ = STEQ and hence that TEQ = T̂EQ . As a consequence, STEQ has to be
directed as well, which concludes the proof.
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Combining the previous theorem and the definition of TEQ , Conjecture 2 entails that
TEQ = ˚TEQ = T̂EQ .
6 Quantitative Concepts
In Section 3, several solution concepts were defined by collecting the maximal elements of
inclusion-maximal qualified subsets. In this section, we replace maximality with respect
to set inclusion by maximality with respect to cardinality, i.e., we look at qualified
subsets containing the largest number of elements.
6.1 Maximal Qualified Subsets
For every set of finite sets S, define max≤(S) = {S ∈ S | |S| ≥ |S
′| for all S′ ∈ S}. In
analogy to Definition 10, we can now define a solution concept that yields the maximal
elements of the largest qualified subsets.
Definition 19. Let Q be a concept of qualified subsets. Then, the tournament solution
S#
Q
is defined as
S#
Q
(T ) = {max
≺
(B) | B ∈ max
≤
(Q(T ))}.
Obviously, S#
Q
⊆ SQ for all concepts of qualified subsets Q. For the concept of qualified
subsetsM, i.e., the set of subsets that admit a maximal element, we obtain the Copeland
set.
Copeland set. S#
M
(T ) returns the Copeland set CO(T ) of a tournament T , i.e., the set
of all alternatives whose dominion is of maximal size (Copeland, 1951).11
6.2 Minimal Stable Sets
When the Copeland set is taken as the basis for stable sets, some tournaments contain
more than one inclusion-minimal externally stable set and, even worse, do not admit a
set that satisfies both internal and external stability (see Figure 3 for an example).
However, as it turns out, every tournament is the summary of some tournament con-
sisting only of homogeneous components that admits a unique internally and externally
CO-stable set. For example, when replacing a4 and a5 in the tournament given in Fig-
ure 3 with 3-cycle components, the set of all alternatives is internally and externally
stable. The following definition captures this strengthened notion of stability.
Definition 20. Let S be a tournament solution and T˜ = ({1, . . . , k}, ≻˜) a tourna-
ment. Then, B˜ ⊆ {1, . . . , k} is strongly stable with respect to tournament solution
11This set is usually attributed to Copeland despite the fact that Zermelo (1929) and Llull (as early as
1283, see Ha¨gele and Pukelsheim 2001) have suggested equivalent concepts much earlier.
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a1
a2a3
a4a5
Figure 3: Example tournament T = (A,≻) that does not contain an internally and
externally CO -stable set. There are eight externally CO-stable sets (e.g., A,
{a2, a3, a4, a5}, or {a1, a2, a5}), none of which is internally stable.
S (or strongly S-stable) if there exist homogeneous tournaments T1, . . . , Tk on k dis-
joint sets B1, . . . , Bk ⊆ X such that B =
⋃
i∈B˜ Bi is internally and externally S-stable
in T = Π(T˜ , T1, . . . , Tk). The set of strongly S-stable sets for a given tournament
T = (A,≻) will be denoted by S˜S(T ) = {B ⊆ A | B is strongly S-stable in T}.
Now, in analogy to Ŝ, we can define a tournament solution that yields the minimal
strongly S-stable set with respect to some underlying tournament solution S.
Definition 21. Let S be a tournament solution. Then, the tournament solution
⌢
S is
defined as
⌢
S(T ) =
⋃
min
⊆
(S˜S(T )).
The following result follows from observations made independently by Laffond et al.
(1993b) and Fisher and Ryan (1995) (see also Laslier, 1997, 2000).
Theorem 8 (Laffond et al., 1993b). |S˜
S
#
M
(T )| = 1 for all tournaments T .
The unique strongly stable set with respect to the Copeland set is known as the
bipartisan set.
Bipartisan set. The bipartisan set of a tournament T is given by BP(T ) =
⌢
S#
M
(T ). It
was originally defined as the set of alternatives corresponding to the support of the unique
Nash equilibrium of the tournament game (Laffond et al., 1993b). The tournament game
of a tournament is the two-player zero-sum game given by its adjacency matrix.
BP satisfies all basic properties, composition-consistency, and is contained in MC . Its
relationship with BA is unknown (Laffond et al., 1993b).
Interestingly, minimality is not required for
⌢
S#
M
, because there is always exactly one
strongly S#
M
-stable set. Further observe that internally and externally stable sets and
strongly stable sets coincide when the underlying solution concept satisfies COM. This
is the case for MC , ME , and TEQ . Even though, TC does not satisfy COM, it is easily
verified that replacing alternatives with homogeneous components does not affect the
top cycle of a tournament. It is thus possible to define all mentioned concepts using
minimal strongly stable sets instead of stable sets (see Table 1).
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S
⌢
S
Condorcet non-losers (CNL) Top cycle (TC )
Copeland set (CO) Bipartisan set (BP)
Uncovered set (UC ) Minimal covering set (MC )
Banks set (BA) Minimal extending set (ME)
Tournament equilibrium set (TEQ) Tournament equilibrium set (TEQ)
Table 1: Tournament solutions and their minimal strongly stable counterparts. The
representation of TEQ as a stable set relies on Conjecture 2.
7 Conclusion
We proposed a unifying treatment of tournament solutions based on maximal quali-
fied subsets and minimal stable sets. Given the results of Section 4 and Section 5, a
central role in the theory of tournament solutions may be ascribed to Conjecture 2, a
statement of considerable mathematical depth. Conjecture 2 has a number of appealing
consequences on minimal stable sets, some of which have been proved already.
(i) Every tournament T admits a unique minimal dominant set TC (T ) (as shown
by Good, 1971). TC satisfies all basic properties and is the finest solution concept
satisfying SSP and CNL-exclusivity.
(ii) Every tournament T admits a unique minimal covering set MC (T ) (as shown
by Dutta, 1988). MC satisfies all basic properties and is the finest solution concept
satisfying SSP and UC -exclusivity.
(iii) Every tournament T admits a unique minimal extending set ME(T ) (open prob-
lem). ME satisfies all basic properties and is the finest solution concept satisfying
SSP and BA-exclusivity.
(iv) Every tournament T admits a unique minimal TEQ-retentive set TEQ(T ) (open
problem). TEQ satisfies all basic properties and is the finest solution concept
satisfying retentiveness and the finest solution concept S such that S satisfies SSP
and, for all tournaments T = (A,≻), S(A) = A \ {a} only if a 6∈ S(D(b)) for every
b ∈ A.
(v) The following inclusion relationships hold: TEQ ⊆ ME ⊆ MC ⊆ TC and ME ⊆
BA.12
Conjecture 1 is a weaker version of Conjecture 2, which implies all of the above state-
ments except those that involve TEQ.
12A consequence of these inclusions is that deciding whether an alternative is contained in the minimal
extending set of a tournament is NP-hard. This follows from a proof by Brandt et al. (2010), which
establishes hardness of all solution concepts that are sandwiched between BA and TEQ.
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Table 2 and Figure 4 summarize the properties and set-theoretic relationships of the
considered tournament solutions, respectively.
Solution Concept Origin MON IUA WSP SSP COM IRR
SM2 (CNL) X X X – – –
SM (UC ) Fishburn (1977); Miller (1980) X – X – X –
SM∗ (BA) Banks (1985) X – X – X X
ŜM2 (TC ) Good (1971); Smith (1973) X X X X – –
ŜM (MC ) Dutta (1988) X X X X X –
ŜM∗ (ME) X
a
X
a
X
a
X
a
X X
T̂EQ (TEQ) Schwartz (1990) Xb Xb Xb Xb X X
S
#
M
(CO) Copeland (1951) X – – – – –
⌢
S
#
M
(BP) Laffond et al. (1993b) X X X X X –
aThis statement relies on Conjecture 1.
bThis statement relies on Conjecture 2.
Table 2: Properties of solution concepts (MON: monotonicity, IUA: independence of un-
chosen alternatives, WSP: weak superset property, SSP: strong superset prop-
erty, COM: composition-consistency, IRR: irregularity). See Laslier (1997) for
all results not shown in this paper.
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